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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal direct/indirect tax mix problem when individuals dif-
fer in several unobservable characteristics (productivity and endowments). It presents
general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates and proves that contrary to
Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) result, differential commodity taxation remains a useful
instrument of tax policy even if preferences are separable between labor and produced
goods. When cross substitution effects are zero, the expressions resemble traditional
many households Ramsey rules. In a Cobb-Douglas illustration, where endowments
differ only in good 1 (interpreted as “wealth”), the tax on good 2 provides an indirect
way to tax the unobservable wealth.
JEL classifications: H21; H23
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1 Introduction
The choice between direct and indirect taxation is one of the “oldest issues of taxation
policy” (Atkinson (1977)). It raises challenging theoretical questions and is of significant
policy relevance. The theoretical controversy is mirrored by the diverging solutions
which have been adopted in various countries. Cross-country comparisons reveal striking
differences in the tax mix. Indirect taxes (VAT in particular) represent an important
part of tax revenues in European countries, but they play only an insignificant role in
the US (at least at the federal level). Even within the European Union, the degree of
reliance on indirect taxes differs notably between member states.1
Much of the earlier debate was marked by an ambiguity in the very definition of
direct and indirect taxation. Originally, the distinction was often based on the notion
of “shifting”, with taxes believed to be easily shifted called indirect taxes (Due and
Friedlander (1973, p. 229)). A more satisfactory approach has been suggested by Atkin-
son (1977) (see also Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980)) who argues that “. . . the essential
aspect of the distinction [is] the fact that direct taxes may be adjusted to the individ-
ual characteristics of the taxpayer, whereas indirect taxes are levied on transactions
irrespective of the circumstance of buyer and seller.” Our modelling of the different
tax instruments is closely inspired by Atkinson’s information based distinction. Income
taxation is viewed as direct because it can be made progressive, whereas commodity
taxation is indirect, in the sense that it is based on anonymous transactions and can
only be proportional.
The role of indirect taxes as instruments of optimal tax policy has been severely
undermined by the publication of Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) influential paper. They
have shown that when preferences are weakly separable in labor supply and produced
1According to OECD figures (for 1995), indirect taxes represent on average 31.4% of total tax rev-
enues in the EU (versus 17.9% in the US); their share ranges from about 26% (Belgium, The Netherlands
and Sweden) to 44.6% (Portugal).
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goods, nonlinear income taxation does not need to be supplemented by commodity
taxation: any second best optimum can be achieved by income taxation alone.2 The
practical implications of Atkinson and Stiglitz’s result certainly hinge on the empirical
validity of their separability assumption, which has been questioned (see e.g., Browning
and Meghir (1991)). However, the spirit of their result goes through even under non-
separability as long as labor supply has no “significant” effect on individuals’ marginal
rates of substitution (between goods). A strong case for commodity taxation must thus
rest on a substantial impact of labor supply on the willingness to pay for the produced
goods and to the best of our knowledge, such a case has not yet been made. Some
alternative lines of attack have been explored like, for instance, tax evasion in Boadway
et al. (1994)), and uncertainty in Cremer and Gahvari (1995)). More recently, Naito
(1999) has shown that Atkinson and Stiglitz’s result also rests on the linearity of the
technologies. Under more general production technologies, commodity taxes may have a
role to play because they affect wage differentials, which in turn relaxes the self-selection
constraint(s).
The most fundamental shortcoming of Atkinson and Stiglitz’s analysis appears, how-
ever, to be of a completely different nature. They assume (like most of the literature on
non linear income taxation) that individuals differ in one single characteristic, namely
wage (earning ability). There are no taste differences nor any other sources of hetero-
geneity (like wealth differentials). This assumption appears to be motivated by technical
considerations rather than by economic or empirical arguments. There is certainly no
reason to believe that individuals are alike in all respects but their earning ability;
however, so far, this assumption has been the price to pay for solving the optimal taxa-
tion problem. Multidimensional heterogeneity (adverse selection) would have made the
problem quite untractable.3 As a matter of fact, the difficulty is not so much to show
2Stiglitz (1988) forcefully points out the policy implications of this result and writes: “It can be
shown that if one has a well-designed income tax, adding differential commodity tax is likely to add
little, if anything, to the ability to redistribute income” (p. 494).
3On the technical difficulties raised by multi-dimensional screening models see, for instance, Arm-
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that Atkinson and Stiglitz’s result does not in general hold in such a setting. This can
easily be shown without solving the overall problem and Mirrlees (1976) has already
made this point (for the case of taste differences). The challenging problem is to provide
a characterization of optimal commodity taxes.
In this paper, we consider a setting where individuals differ not only in earning
abilities but also in endowments. Intuitively, such a difference can be thought of as
reflecting wealth inequality. In the general model, endowments are allowed to differ for
all goods. However, the analogy with wealth is most compelling in the special case when
endowments are positive and different for only one good.4 Consequently, this case is
given special emphasis. This interpretation in terms of wealth inequality is clearly only a
static shortcut for a problem which is in reality dynamic. Furthermore, wealth differen-
tials are, at least in part, endogenous and result from individual accumulation decisions.
On the other hand, the evidence shows that a significant fraction of wealth inequalities
are explained by differences in inherited wealth (see e.g., Arrondel et al.(1997)). As far
as this part of individuals’ wealth is concerned, the analogy with endowments appears
quite compelling.5
Following Atkinson and Stiglitz’s approach, we do not impose any ad hoc restric-
tions on the class of available tax instruments. These are constrained solely by the
information structure. We assume that individual types (characterized by earning abil-
ities and endowments) are not publicly observable. This rules out first-best taxation of
types. Before-tax (labor) incomes on the other hand are observable so that a non-linear
income tax can be imposed. As for the produced goods, neither personal consumption
levels, nor personal net transactions (consumption minus endowment) are publicly ob-
strong and Rochet (1999).
4This is of course in addition to the individuals’ endowments in time.
5In reality, capital income is typically subject to taxation and this may mitigate the impact of this
second source of heterogeneity. However, non-labor income is only an imperfect signal for wealth.
Furthermore, at least in the European context, the ability to tax capital income is severely undermined
by the phenomenon of tax competition; see Cremer et al. (1996).
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servable. The tax administration has, however, information on anonymous transactions.
Consequently, non-linear commodity taxes are not feasible, while linear (proportional)
commodity taxes are available.6 Throughout the paper we shall concentrate on the case
of separable preferences, for this allows us to keep in line with the spirit of Atkinson
and Stiglitz’s result.7
Within this setting we characterize the optimal tax mix and study under which con-
ditions it includes (non-uniform) commodity taxes. We show that commodity taxes are
needed, except when all pairs of types who are linked by a binding incentive constraint
have identical endowments. This condition is satisfied in a trivial way when all have
identical endowments, but then one essentially returns to Atkinson and Stiglitz’s setting.
Otherwise, the condition is quite stringent and not likely to be satisfied in economically
meaningful cases.
Next, we present general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates. These
expressions include efficiency terms (compensated demand elasticities) reflecting dead-
weight losses and incentive terms reflecting the impact of commodity taxes on self-
selection constraints (and thus on the feasible extent of redistribution). Incentive ef-
fects are measured by weighted sums of incremental net demands (consumption minus
endowment) of the mimicker (compared to the mimicked individual). Interestingly, it
thus appears that the benefits of commodity taxes are of redistributive nature which
contradicts the traditional view that commodity taxes tend to be regressive and can be
justified (if at all) only by efficiency considerations.
6Atkinson and Stiglitz do allow for non-linear commodity taxes (they assume that individual con-
sumption levels of all goods are observable). Though not realistic, this assumption is perfectly appro-
priate from their perspective. It can only strengthen their case: when non-linear taxes are not needed,
linear taxes certainly cannot do any better. Our purpose is, however, exactly the opposite of theirs:
we want to document the usefulness of commodity taxes. This case is strengthened by imposing the
most stringent restrictions on commodity taxes. Furthermore, we want to provide a characterization of
optimal commodity taxes and such an exercise is meaningful only if it rests on a realistic information
structure. Put differently, there is no point in characterizing hypothetical optimal non-linear taxes when
the information required to impose them is not available.
7To show the usefulness of commodity taxation this assumption does not involve any loss of generality.
It could be restrictive, though, as far as the characterization of optimal commodity taxes is concerned.
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When cross substitution effects are zero, so that the “reduced” Slutsky matrix is
diagonal, the expressions are considerably simplified. Optimal tax rates are then pro-
portional to inverse compensated prices elasticities and to (the weighted average of) in-
cremental net consumption levels of mimickers (for the considered good). These expres-
sions have a familiar flavor and resemble traditional (many households) Ramsey rules.
However, redistributional benefits are no longer measured by differences in effective con-
sumption levels but depend on the hypothetical consumption levels of mimickers. This
is because there is also a (non-linear) income tax, which implies that commodity taxes
enhance redistribution only if they relax otherwise binding self-selection constraints.8
If differences in endowments are confined to some of the goods, our results imply
particularly simple tax rules for the goods in which endowments are zero (or identical).
For these goods, the tax rate is positively related to income elasticity. In particular,
normal goods ought to be taxed, while inferior goods should be subsidized.
Finally, we consider a Cobb-Douglas illustration with two goods, where endowments
differ only in one of the goods, say good 1 (with endowments interpreted as “wealth” or
non-labor income). In this case, the redistributive role of commodity taxation becomes
even more evident. A tax on the produced good 2 now provides an indirect way to
tax the unobservable wealth. This point is reinforced by the numerical calculations
which show that the tax (on good 2) is higher (i) the more significant are the wealth
differentials, (ii) the stronger is the correlation between wealth and earning ability and
(iii) the larger are the (political) weights attached to low wealth individuals.
8The argument that a particular policy instrument can usefully supplement optimal nonlinear income
taxes if (and only if) it relaxes an otherwise binding incentive constraint has been made by a number of
authors; see e.g., Stiglitz (1987), who provides a reformulation of the Atkinson-Stiglitz result in a two
group model or Boadway and Marchand (1995), Cremer and Gahvari (1997) and Boadway, Marchand
and Sato (1998) who consider in-kind transfers. Other examples include Boadway and Keen (1993) who
study the provision of public goods, Cremer and Gahvari (1998) who consider housing subsidies, and
Rochet (1991) as well as Cremer and Pestieau (1996) who deal with social insurance.
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2 The model
Consider a simple extension of the standard income taxation model (Mirrlees (1971),
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)). There areN types of individuals (i = 1, . . . , N) who differ
in their labor productivities ni and their initial endowments ωi ofm consumption goods.
The proportion of types i in the population is denoted πi. All individuals have the same
strictly quasi-concave utility function: u(Ci)−v(Li), where Ci is the consumption vector
and Li denotes labor supply. Separability is assumed for the sake of simplicity but also
to keep in line with the spirit of the Atkinson and Stiglitz result. Technologies are
linear: with one unit of time, individual i produces ni units of “elementary” labor; one
unit of “elementary” labor, in turn, produces one unit of any of the m commodities.
Normalize the producer price of commodity 1 at one. All markets being competitive,
the wage rate of individual i equals ni and the producer prices of all commodities equal
one.
In the tradition of the optimal income taxation literature, we assume that an indi-
vidual’s type (characterized by ni and ωi) and labor supply are not observable by the tax
administration. His before-tax (labor) income, I i = niLi, on the other hand, is. This
rules out first-best taxation of types, while allowing non-linear taxation of incomes.
Furthermore, neither personal consumption levels, Ci, nor personal net transactions
Zi = Ci−ωi are publicly observable. The tax administration has, however, information
on anonymous transactions. Under this circumstance, non-linear commodity taxes are
not feasible, while linear commodity taxes are available. This is the standard (though
often only implicit) assumption in the literature, so much that it has been used as part
of the very definition of indirect taxes; see Section 1.
To sum up, the tax policy consists of a non-linear tax T (·) on labor income and of t,
the m-vector of per-unit commodity taxes which determine p = 1I+ t, the m-vector of
consumer prices, where 1I is the unit vector. The problem of individual i is then given
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by:
max u(Ci)− v(Li)
s.t. p · (Ci − wi) = Ii − T (Ii) (1)
Ii = niLi. (2)
Note that all vectors are column matrices. Transposed vectors are denoted by the
superscript T . The symbol “ · ” is used for the scalar product; for instance p·Ci = pTCi.
Because of the separability of preferences, the problem can be also written as
max V (p,Ri)− v
Ã
Ii
ni
!
s.t. Ri = Ii − T (Ii) + p · wi, (3)
where Ri denotes the disposable income of individual i (after tax labor income plus
market value of endowments), and V (p,R) is the indirect utility function associated
with u(·):
V (p,R) = max {u(C), p · C = R} . (4)
Them-vector of demand functions (solutions of (4)) is denoted by C(p,R), while C˜(p, u)
denotes the vector of compensated demand functions.9 For future reference note that the
traditional Slutsky decomposition, as well as Roy’s identity apply (for all k = 1, . . . ,m):
∂C˜
∂pk
(p, V (p,R)) =
∂C
∂pk
(p,R) +
∂C
∂R
(p,R)Ck(p,R), (5)
∂V
∂pk
(p,R) + Ck(p,R)
∂V
∂R
(p,R) = 0. (6)
Since the distribution of types is discrete (i = 1, . . . , N) the income tax schedule can
be summarized by the N points (Ii, T i) representing the individuals’ respective choices.
9Observe that these functions are the same for all individuals. They are independent of ni because
preferences are separable and ωi only enters through Ri.
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Because types are private information, incentive compatibility constraints require that
the utility obtained by each individual i when he consumes (I i, T i):
U i = V (p,Ri)− v
Ã
Ii
ni
!
, (7)
be at least equal to the utility level he would obtain by choosing (Ih, Th) (“mimicking”
individual h), that is:
U ih = V (p,Rih)− v
Ã
Ih
ni
!
, (8)
where
Rih = Rh + p(ωi − ωh).
We can now move on to the government’s problem. It aims at maximizing a weighted
sum of utilities, subject to a revenue constraint and the incentive compatibility con-
straints. The weight of types i is denoted by αiπi (with αi ≥ 0, and Pj αj = 1)10.
Formally, this problem can be stated as follows:
Problem P
max
(Ri,Ii)i,p2,...,pm
NX
i=1
αiπiU i
s.t.
NX
i=1
πi
³
Ii −Ri + (p− 1I) · C(p,Ri) + 1I · ωi
´
≥ G (9)
U i ≥ U ih i, h = 1, . . . ,N (10)
where G is the (exogenous) revenue requirement, while U i is given by (7) and U ih by
(8). Observe that with one extra degree of freedom in setting commodity tax rates, t1
is set equal to zero so that p1 = 1.11 Finally, (p − 1I) = (0, p2 − 1, . . . , pm − 1)T = t is
the vector of per unit taxes.
10This is useful for separating the effect of varying the distribution of types and varying the distribution
of political weights. In particular the utilitarian solution corresponds to αi ≡ 1/N (uniform weights).
11To see this most easily, notice that the revenue constraint of the government could also be written
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3 Characterizing the optimal tax mix
We now derive the first order conditions of the government’s problem. Denoting the
multipliers of constraints (9) and (10) by λ and μih respectively, one can write the
Lagrangian expression associated with P as follows:
Λ =
NX
i=1
αiπiU i + λ
Ã NX
i=1
πi
³
Ii −Ri + (p− 1I) · C(p,Ri) + 1I · ωi
´
−G
!
+
NX
i,h=1
μih(U i − U ih), (11)
The first order conditions with respect to Ri (i = 1, . . . , n) and pk (k = 2, . . . ,m)
are given by:12
∂Λ
∂Ri
=
Ã
αiπi +
X
h
μih
!
∂V
∂R
(p,Ri)− λπi
∙
1− (p− 1I)∂C
∂R
(p,Ri)
¸
−
X
h
μhi
∂V
∂R
(p,Rhi) = 0, (12)
∂Λ
∂pk
=
X
i
Ã
αiπi +
X
h
μih
!
∂V
∂pk
(p,Ri) + λ
X
i
πi
Ã
Ck(p,Ri)
+ (p− 1I) · ∂C
∂pk
(p,Ri)
!
−
X
h,i
μhi
∂V
∂pk
(p,Rhi)
−
X
h,i
μhi
∂V
∂R
(p,Rhi)(ωhk − ωik) = 0. (13)
This last expression can be simplified by introducing (for all k = 2, . . . ,m) the
compensated derivative of Λ with respect to pk, defined by:
∂Λ˜
∂pk
≡ ∂Λ
∂pk
+
X
i
∂Λ
∂Ri
· Ck(p,Ri). (14)
as:
NX
i=1
πi
Ã
Ii −
mX
k=1
Ck(p,Ri) +
mX
k=1
ωik
!
≥ G.
This expression is homogenous of degree zero in p and Ri’s and this property clearly also applies to the
objective function and incentive constraints.
12The first-order conditions with respect to Ii are not directly relevant for our purposes.
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Substituting (12) and (13) into (14), using (5) and (6), and rearranging yields:
∂Λ˜
∂pk
=(p− 1I) ·
Ã
λ
X
i
πi
∂C˜
∂pk
(p, V (p,Ri))
!
+
X
h,i
μhi
∂V
∂R
(p,Rhi)
³
(Ck(p,Rhi)− ωhk )− (Ck(p,Ri)− ωik)
´
. (15)
At the optimum, we must have ∂Λ˜/∂pk = 0, for k = 2, . . . ,m. (Recall that p1
is conventionally set to 1). Consequently, we obtain a system of (m − 1) equations,
represented synthetically by:13
−
Ã
λ
X
i
πi
∂C˜
∂p
(p, V (p,Ri))
!
(p− 1I) =
X
h,i
μhi
∂V
∂R
(p,Rhi)
³
Zhi − Zi
´
, (16)
where, Zi and Zhi denote the net consumption vectors (consumption minus endowment)
of individual i, and of individual h mimicking individual i.14
The left-hand side of system (16) represents the marginal dead-weight losses associ-
ated with the distortions of consumption prices. It vanishes when p = 1I (no commodity
taxation) and is proportional to the image of the tax vector (p− 1I) by the (aggregate)
“reduced” Slutsky substitution matrix, a (m− 1)× (m− 1) matrix defined by:
S = (σjk)j,k=2,...,m
with
σjk =
X
i
πi
∂C˜j
∂pk
(p, V (p,Ri)). (17)
The right-hand side of (16) figures the marginal benefits (in terms of “rent extraction”)
of distorting consumption prices.
Observe that with u strictly quasi concave, the matrix S is a convex combination
of negative definite matrices. Consequently, it is itself negative definite, and invertible.
Rearranging (16) then yields the following proposition.
13From now on, we redefine p as the (m−1) vector (p2, . . . , pm)T . Similarly, ∂C˜/∂p is a (m−1)×(m−1)
matrix, namely the Slutsky matrix from which the first line and the first column are removed; see (17).
14Formally, Zi is the vector of Zik, k = 2, . . . ,m, where Z
i
k ≡ Ck(p,Ri) − ωik. Similarly, Zhi is the
vector of Zhik , k = 2, . . . ,m with Z
hi
k ≡ Ck(p,Rhi)− ωhk .
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Proposition 1 The optimal commodity taxes are characterized by
t = p− 1I = −S−1
⎛
⎝X
h,i
μhi
λ
∂V
∂R
(p,Rhi) ·∆hiZ
⎞
⎠ , (18)
where ∆hiZ denotes Zhi − Zi = [C(p,Rhi)− ωh]− [C(p,Ri)− ωi] i.e., the incremental
net demands of the mimicker.
Let us first analyze the conditions under which the right hand side of (18) vanishes.
In that case, one indeed returns to the Atkinson and Stiglitz result: optimal commodity
taxes are zero and the tax policy solely relies on income taxation. This result emerges
when, for all binding incentive compatibility constraints (represented by the couples
(h, i) for which μhi > 0), the net consumption bundle of the “mimicker” Zhi equals
the net consumption bundle of the “mimicked” Zi. Since Rhi = Ri + p(wh − wi), this
happens essentially only when mimicker and mimicked have the same initial endowments
for all goods. Thus we obtain a simple extension of the Atkinson and Stiglitz result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that, at the solution of (P), μhi(whk − wik) = 0 for all h, i =
1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . ,m. Then the vector of optimal commodity tax rates is zero:
p∗ = 1I.
The condition in proposition 2 is quite stringent. It holds in a trivial way, when
all types have identical endowment vectors. This does not come as a surprise for with
identical endowments one essentially returns to the original Atkinson and Stiglitz set-
ting. However, the condition also holds in a slightly more general setting: it is sufficient
that all pairs of types which are linked by a binding incentive constraint have identical
endowments. For instance, if all types except for, say, j have identical endowments the
optimum implies zero commodity taxes if no incentive constraint involving type j (ei-
ther from j or towards j) is binding. Though not impossible, such an outcome appears
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to be more of a technical curiosity than an economically meaningful case.15 Except
under these conditions, the compensated derivative of Λ with respect to p does not, in
general, vanish at p = 1I. Consequently, the Atkinson and Stiglitz result fails to apply
(as a general property) when endowments differ between individuals.
There is some similarity between this analysis and Guesnerie (1995, Section 4.4),
who however deals with the one dimensional case. Guesnerie’s formula (4.48) includes
incremental net demand terms like our expression (18). Furthermore, Guesnerie in-
troduces the concept of indiscernible agents, which can be applied here for individuals
meeting the condition of Proposition 2.16 Like in Guesnerie, indiscernibility implies that
there is no role for commodity taxes.
Having shown that commodity taxation is (generally) needed, we shall now discuss
its optimal structure. This calls for a more thorough analysis of (18). When cross
substitution effects are zero (so that S−1 is diagonal), expression (18) implies that
optimal tax rates are proportional to inverse (own compensated price) elasticities and
to (the weighted average of) incremental net consumption bundles of mimickers. The
“inverse elasticity” part of this rule is rather standard. Everything else equal, the goods
which ought to be taxed most heavily are those for which compensated demand is least
elastic (for they imply a smaller distortion).
The “incremental net demand” term, on the other hand, reflects the welfare impact
of commodity taxes via their effects on the incentive constraints. Its sign determines
the sign of the optimal tax on the considered good. For instance, if every mimicker for
whom the incentive constraint binds has a higher net demand for good k than the type
whom he mimics (i.e., Zhik − Zik > 0 for each pair h, i such that μhi > 0) then good
15The only case with some economic significance we can think of is when the weights (in the objective
function) are such that the solution coincides with, or is in the neighborhood of the competitive equilib-
rium (which, as is well known, is incentive compatible). In that case, however, there is no distortionary
taxation whatsoever, neither on income nor on commodities.
16If the mimicker has the same endowments as the mimicked individual, he will have the same trans-
actions on all commodities. Recall that preferences are separable.
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k should face a positive tax. This is quite intuitive: a tax on k “hurts” the mimicker
more than the mimicked and thus allows one to relax an otherwise binding incentive
constraint.17 Not surprisingly the opposite condition (i.e., Zhik − Zik < 0 for each pair
h, i such that μhi > 0) yields a negative tax (i.e., a subsidy) for good k. Finally if the
sign of Zhik − Zik is not the same for all relevant pairs, the weighted average of these
terms (with weights proportional to the shadow price of the corresponding incentive
constraint) determines the sign of the expression and thus of the optimal tax.
This argument can further be refined for the case where individuals have identical
(possibly zero) endowments in good k (while endowments differ in some other good(s)).
Concentrating on the “normal case” where redistribution occurs from the rich (with
higher consumption budgets) to the poor, we obtain a simple result according to which
normal goods ought to be taxed while inferior goods should be subsidized.18 Put dif-
ferently, the tax on good k tends to be higher, the higher is its income elasticity. Recall
that the compensated price elasticity also matters and acts in the opposite direction.
This is quite in line with the results obtained in standard optimal tax models (e.g., a
many households Ramsey model combined with a linear income tax; see Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980, Section 14-2)).
Such a simple rule, however, cannot be obtained if endowments in k differ. Mimickers
may continue to consume more of the normal goods than the mimicked; however, their
net demand is not necessarily higher. In particular, they may be rich precisely because
they have a large endowment in good k.
Recall that all this applies only if cross-substitution effects are zero. For the general
case, not much can be said without further restrictions. However, (16) can still be in-
17Net demands can of course be negative, but this does not affect the argument. For instance if net
demands are negative for both mimicker and mimicked, the above condition implies that the mimicker
“benefits” less from the tax than the mimicked.
18With uniform endowments (for the considered good), differences in net demands equal differences
in consumption levels. Now, if all the mimickers have higher disposable incomes than the mimicked,
they will have larger consumption levels of the normal goods.
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terpreted along the lines familiar in Ramsey type models. Because of the symmetry of
the substitution matrix, the LHS is then essentially (a linear approximation of) the “re-
duction in compensated demand” induced by the tax system.19 From the interpretation
of the RHS it then follows that this reduction ought to be larger for the goods bought
more heavily by the mimickers. For the goods with zero (or identical) endowments, we
obtain (in the “normal case”) that the reduction in compensated demand ought to be
larger for normal than for inferior goods.
Observe that welfare weights αi’s do not appear explicitly in (18). This is in contrast
with many person Ramsey rules. Rather they are replaced with the incentive weights
μhi.20 This reflects the fact that the welfare impact of commodity taxation is associated
with its impact on incentive constraints.
Before proceeding, we should point out that these interpretations have to be con-
sidered with great care. The link between income elasticity and taxation rests on the
“normal case” assumption which corresponds to the intuitively appealing idea that in-
centive constraints bind along the direction of decreasing consumption budgets. This
assumption is quite meaningful in the traditional one-dimensional characteristics case
where it arises for a large class of welfare functions (weights).21 At first, one might
be tempted to think that such an intuitive property ought to carry over to the two-
dimensional case. Under closer scrutiny, however, such a conjecture turns out to be
misleading. The examples considered below will make it clear that what is “normal”
in the one-dimensional case may be rather “special” in a multi-dimensional setting.
Consequently, we cannot claim that the results discussed above have some general rel-
evance (even if one is prepared to accept the underlying assumptions on the preference
structure).
19When the tax is negative, the “reduction” become an increase, but the argument does not change.
20Which do of course depend on the welfare weights.
21Including a utilitarian objective. The opposite result arises only if the rich receive a higher (and
sufficiently significant) weight than the poor.
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At this level of generality, any prospects for a more precise interpretation of (16)
and/or (18) appear to be limited. Any results rest on the pattern of binding incentive
constraints, and this cannot be predicted on the basis of the first-order conditions alone.
Consequently, we shall now turn to the study of a more specific example. Though not
meant to be realistic, this illustration will allow us to reach a better understanding of
the qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure.
The illustration we adopt is based on a Cobb-Douglas specification. This choice
is motivated by the fact that we want to make a case for commodity taxation and
Cobb-Douglas preferences certainly are the least likely to support such a claim. If types
differ only in one dimension (productivity), Cobb-Douglas preferences consistently imply
uniform commodity taxes. Furthermore, even a linear income tax is then sufficient to
make commodity taxes a redundant instrument. This is essentially because, with this
preference structure, all goods have the same income elasticity (which moreover equals
one). Consequently, it is plain that whenever Cobb-Douglas preferences require (non-
uniform) commodity taxes the adoption of a more general preference structure can only
reinforce this property.
The simple specification we use has the following features. There are only two
produced goods (m = 2) and initial endowments consist only of commodity one: ωi2 ≡ 0.
Setting the consumer price of commodity one at one, we can therefore drop the index
k and adopt the following simplified notation: ωi = ωi1, p2 = p. Observe that within
this setting an individual’s endowment can be interpreted as his “wealth” (or non-labor
income). The utility function is given by: u(C) = C1/41 C
1/4
2 , so that:
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C2(p,R) =
R
2p
and
∂C˜2
∂p
= − R
4p2
. (19)
22Equal weights are used to avoid additional a priori asymmetries between the goods. This gives
uniform commodity taxes the best chances to emerge.
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Expression (18) then becomes:
p− 1
p
=
2
λ
·
P
h,i μhi
∂V
∂R (p,R
hi)(ωh − ωi)
(
P
i πiRi)
. (20)
In words, the optimal tax rate (on good 2) has the same sign as a weighted sum of
the difference between the mimickers’ endowment (“wealth”), ωh, and the mimicked’s
endowment (“wealth”), ωi. Intuitively this makes a lot of sense. Individuals have no
endowments in good 2, which has an income elasticity of one. Consequently, wealthier
individuals necessarily consume (and buy) a larger quantity of that good. Taxing this
good is thus desirable if the incentive constraints (or at least those with the highest
shadow prices) bind from high wealth to low wealth individuals. In that case, the
commodity tax can be seen as an indirect way to tax the unobservable endowment.
Unlike a direct taxation of the endowments, it has of course the drawback that it creates
distortions. Put differently, commodity taxation appears as an imperfect (second-best)
substitute for a (first-best) lump sum tax based on endowments. Notice that if incentive
constraints bind from low to high wealth individuals, one gets exactly the opposite
argument. In both cases, however, the tax on good 2 will not in general be equal to
zero.
The crucial question that remains open is to know whether incentive constraints
effectively bind from high wealth to low wealth individuals. Clearly, this will not neces-
sarily be the case. One can expect this to depend on the relative inequality of endow-
ments (as compared to productivity differentials) as well as on the correlation between
endowments and productivity. In addition, the weights in the welfare function may be
of crucial importance. These issues will be addressed in the simulations to which we
now turn.
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Figure 1: The distribution of types
4 The determinants of the optimal tax mix: some illus-
trations
Our simulations are based on the following specification:
• 2 commodities (m = 2), endowments only in good 1: (wi, 0)
• 4 types (denoted by i = A,B,C,D) distributed on a rectangle (as depicted on
Figure 1) with n1 = 5, n2 = 10 and ω1 ≤ ω2 . Binding incentive constraints will
be represented by arrows (e.g., AB on Figure 1)
• Cobb-Douglas utility for consumption:
u(C1, C2) = C
1/4
1 C
1/4
2
• quadratic disutility of labor:
v(L) = L2
• revenue requirement:
G = 5.
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Types i A B C D
Incomes Ii 7.37 6.70 23.73 20.47
Taxes T i 1.92 1.99 7.10 6.87
Disposable income Ri 7.45 14.71 18.63 23.57
MRSi 0.82 1.05 1.04 1.01
Utilities U i 2.14 3.32 2.84 3.73
Table 1: Central variant: results
For the remaining parameters we consider several alternative values. We start with
the following “central” specification:
• endowments:
ω1 = 2 ω2 = 10
• uniform distribution of types:
πi ≡ 1
4
• uniform weights:
αi ≡ 1
4
.
The numerical solution of this central specification is given in the next subsection.
4.1 The Solution of Central Variant
The optimal consumer price (of commodity 2) is given by p = 1.07; this corresponds
to a tax rate of 7%. The values of the remaining relevant variables are summarized in
Table 1. In addition to labor incomes I i, taxes T i and disposable incomes Ri (defined
by (3)) we have also reported utility levels U i as well as marginal rates of substitution
(MRSi) between disposable income and labor income.23 This variable characterizes the
23Formally it is defined as follows:
MRSi =
dv
dL (
Ii
ni )
ni ∂V∂R (p,R
i)
.
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Figure 2: Central variant: binding incentive constraints
marginal tax rate implied by the implementing income tax schedule. Specifically, one
has MRSi = 1− T 0(Ii), where T 0(Ii) is the marginal income tax rate faced by type i.
Observe thatMRSi < 1 (resp. > 1) corresponds to a positive (resp. negative) marginal
income tax rate on type i.24 Only two incentive compatibility constraints are binding,
namely CD and DA; see Figure 2:
This solution presents a number of interesting features. Let us first consider the
pattern of binding incentive constraints. Based on the intuitions obtained in the one di-
mensional case, one would expect these constraints to bind (in a more or less monotonic
way) along the direction of decreasing disposable incomes.25 The solution shows that
this is not the case. The constraint CD binds, even though D has a higher disposable
income than C. The other binding constraint, DA, goes in the expected direction, but
it is not “local”, in the sense that it links the two extreme types; recall that D has both
high productivity and high wealth, while A has a low productivity and a low wealth.
24See Stiglitz (1987) for a detailed discussion of the implementation in a discrete types setting.
25With uniform weights (and separability) first best optimality calls for an equalization of disposable
incomes. Consequently, it is tempting to think that under asymmetric information one attempts to
reduce inequalities in disposable income as much as possible given the incentive constraints.
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Furthermore, A and B differ in disposable incomes but neither BA nor AB binds.
To explain this surprising pattern, one has to realize that as far as pairs of types
are concerned, the socially most beneficial redistribution is precisely from D to A (most
significant difference in marginal utilities of income). Accordingly, differences in dispos-
able incomes between these two types are reduced until the incentive constraint becomes
binding. Once this constraint is binding, the opportunities of redistribution between
other pairs of types become limited. For instance, an attempt to redistribute from B to
A would interfere with this constraint (making A’s consumption bundle more attractive
for D). Similarly, while it is in principle desirable to transfer money from C to, say, B,
this is also limited by the fact that D has to be granted some informational rent (the
constraint DA being binding). Consequently, if C were taxed “too heavily” he might
want to mimic type D.26
Let us now turn to the optimal commodity tax (good 2) which is positive in this
case. Recall the discussion of (20): what matters is the weighted sum of endowment
differentials between mimicker and mimicked individual. Here, this sum has two terms,
one associated with each binding incentive constraint. In the case of CD, the mimicker
has a lower wealth than the mimicked type, while the opposite is true for DA. Conse-
quently, the two terms are of opposite sign and the sign of the optimal tax depends on
their relative weights. Now, the positive tax indicates that DA receives a higher weight,
which, considering the above discussion, does not come as a surprise.
All this is of course heavily dependent on the distribution of types (support and
26The pattern of marginal income tax rates is also interesting but a detailed analysis of the underlying
income tax schedule would be beyond the scope of this paper. Notice simply that we have negative
marginal tax rates for some groups which is at odds with standard results. Furthermore, the “no
distortion at the top property” does not hold here: no incentive constraint binds towards groups C and
B, but yet they face a nonzero marginal income tax rate. These properties are due to two features: the
multidimensional character of the problem on the one hand and the presence of the linear commodity
tax on the other hand. They are reminiscent of earlier results in the literature. For instance, Brett
(1996) establishes the optimality of negative marginal tax rates in a multidimensional setting. Further,
Nava, Schroyen and Marchand (1996) show in a one-dimensional setting that with a linear commodity
tax, the “top” group faces a nonzero marginal income tax rate.
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ω1 ω2 Binding IC constraints p
0 12 BA, CD, DA 1.14
2 10 CD, DA 1.07
3 9 AB, CD, DA 1.05
4 8 AB, BA, CD, DA, DB 1.02
5 7 AB, BA, CD, DA, DB 1.01
6 6 CA 1.00
Table 2: Impact of wealth inequality
correlation) as well as on the weights. In the following subsections, we shall study the
impact of each of these factors separately.
4.2 The Impact of Wealth Inequality
We shall now study the impact of varying the difference in endowments (ω2 − ω1),
while keeping total endowments ω2+ω1 constant. All other parameters are set at their
central variant values. The results are summarized in Table 2. To keep the presentation
intelligible, we concentrate on the most relevant results for each case, namely the pattern
of binding incentive constraints and the optimal consumer price of good 2.27
It appears that for a given level of total endowments, the optimal commodity tax
on good 2 increases with wealth (endowment) inequality. This result is not surprising
and it reinforces the point that the tax on good 2 is used as an indirect way to tax the
unobservable endowment in good 1 (see Section 3). As expected, the optimal tax is zero
when all types have identical endowments (Proposition 2).28 When wealth differentials
are small, the tax is positive, but “small”. Types who share the same productivity level
are then “close” and the redistributional potential of the commodity tax is limited.
Technically, this is reflected in the fact that there is bunching between A and B.29 At
27More detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
28There are then effectively only two types A = B and C = D.
29The two types are treated alike: same labor supply (labor income) and same tax. In terms of
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π Correlation Binding IC constraints p
0.5, 0, 0, 0.5 1 DA 1.17
0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0.4 Positive BA, CD, DA 1.13
0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25 0 CD, DA 1.07
0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1 Negative AB, CD, DA 1.02
0, 0.5, 0.5, 0 -1 CB 0.98
Table 3: Impact of correlation between productivity and endowments
the other extreme, when wealth differentials are larger than in the central variant case
(line 1), an additional incentive constraint from high to low wealth becomes binding
and the benefits of commodity taxation are increased.30
4.3 The Impact of the Correlation Between Productivity and Initial
Wealth
We now return to the central variant endowment levels (namely w1 = 2, w2 = 10), but
consider alternative distribution of types. In the central variant specification (uniform
distribution) the correlation between productivity and endowment is zero. When the
proportion of types A and D is increased, the distribution reflects a positive correlation
between productivities and endowments. Similarly, higher levels of πB and πC yield
a negative correlation. Once again, we restrict our attention to the most significant
variables which are presented in Table 3.
Not surprisingly, the commodity tax tends to be higher the higher is the correlation
between productivity and wealth. Recall that the commodity tax is an indirect way to
tax endowments. Now, taxing endowments (albeit indirectly) is more beneficial when
a higher endowment tends to go hand in hand with a higher productivity level. Put
incentive constraints, this translates into both AB and BA being binding.
30Contrast this with the arguments presented in Section 4.1. In the central variant case, it does not
pay to redistribute from B to A; the negative impact on DA, outweighs the immediate benefits. When
ω1 = 0, ω2 = 12, on the other hand, such redistribution becomes beneficial and is carried out up to the
point where BA binds.
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differently, under positive correlation, a commodity tax is a substitute not only for
the taxation of (unobservable) endowments but also for the taxation of (unobservable)
productivities. Technically, this is reflected in the direction of the binding incentive
constraints. For instance, under perfect positive correlation only DA is binding, so
that (20) unambiguously calls for a positive commodity tax. Similarly, under perfect
negative correlation, only CB binds which calls for a negative commodity tax.31
4.4 The impact of the government’s political preferences
So far, we have restricted our attention to the case of uniform weights (utilitarian
objective). To conclude our simulation exercise, we shall now consider a few alternative
specifications. We shall concentrate on three extreme cases, which reflect in a highly
stylized way different types of political preferences. First, we consider the Rawlsian case
α = (1, 0, 0, 0) where all the weight is put on the poorest individual.32 This is a quite
traditional case in the optimal tax literature. The other two cases are more unusual. On
the one hand, we consider the case of a “liberal” government which puts all the weight on
the low-wealth individuals, irrespective of their productivity (α = (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0). On the
other hand, we study the case where wealthy individuals receive most of the weight–a
stylized (and certainly debatable) way to account for a right-wing government. The
results are summarized in Table 4.
Both the Rawlsian and the “liberal” case yield a positive and rather significant
commodity tax (up to 76% !).33 At the other extreme, when high-wealth individuals
receive higher weights, the optimal commodity tax is negative (the consumption of
31Observe, however, that even a perfect negative correlation does not necessarily imply a negative
commodity tax. The fact that CB binds in our case means that productivity differentials constitutes the
“dominant” source of inequality. If, on the other hand, productivity differentials were small compared
to wealth differentials, a positive tax could arise even under negative correlation.
32Because of the incentive constraints, type A is necessarily the worst off in our setting.
33Recall that the simulation is based on purely hypothetical parameters, with no claim for realism.
Consequently, only the ranking between scenarios matters; actual levels of taxation have no specific
meaning here.
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α Binding IC constraints p
1,0,0,0 (Rawls) AB, BA, CD, DA, DB 1.76
0.5, 0, 0.5, 0 (left) BA, DA, DC 1.51
0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25 (central variant) CD, DA 1.07
0.1, 0.4, 0.1, 0.4 (right) AB, CD, DA 0.67
Table 4: Impact of political weights
good 2 is subsidized). This may at first appear surprising for commodity taxation is
often viewed as “regressive”. However, it is perfectly in line with the role played by
commodity taxation in this specific setting. Rawlsian and “liberal” governments clearly
have a strong incentive to tax wealth and, once again, the commodity tax is used as an
indirect way to screen for the unobservable endowment.34 Similarly, a subsidy on good
2 favors wealthier individuals and is optimal if they receive a high weight.
5 Concluding comments
This paper has re-examined the optimal direct/indirect tax mix problem in a frame-
work where individuals differ in several unobservable characteristics. It has shown that
contrary to Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) result, differential commodity taxes do have a
role to play as instruments of optimal tax policy–an optimal (general) income tax will
not suffice. To make this point, we have used a model which differs from Atkinson and
Stiglitz’s framework in essentially only one respect: we have considered more than one
dimension of (unobservable) heterogeneity. This single variation has a drastic impact
on the results, though. While Atkinson and Stiglitz’s result remains (of course) valid
within their framework, it does not appear to be robust, and cannot be generalized in
any significant way. From that perspective it can be considered as a technical curiosity
which arises only in a special (and not particularly compelling) case. Though insightful
34Formally, these two specifications translate into incentive constraints which bind from high-wealth
to low-wealth individuals, and the positive tax then follows immediately from (20).
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and interesting in itself, their result thus has to be qualified accordingly. In particular,
it may not be the right basis to justify strong policy recommendations.
We have also derived general expressions for the optimal commodity tax rates and
discussed their interpretation. Commodity taxes impose an efficiency cost through the
distortions they create. However, they are also generally effective in relaxing otherwise
binding incentive constraints. Put differently, they allow a better separation of the
individuals and improve screening for unobservable characteristics. The optimal tax
structure strikes a balance between these conflicting effects, and from that perspective
our expressions resemble traditional optimal tax formulas.
Finally, we have attempted to go beyond these general interpretations and to provide
more specific results. On these grounds, our results are admittedly preliminary, and
more research is certainly needed. The major difficulty with the optimal tax formulas
is that the implied structure of commodity taxes crucially depends on the pattern of
binding incentive constraints. In the single dimensional case it is generally possible to
make “plausible” assumptions about this pattern. The normal assumption is that self
selection constraints bind from the more able to the less able. Under multi-dimensional
adverse selection, however, there is no longer such a compelling “normal” case. For
instance, it is not clear which (if any) of the incentive constraints linking the wealthy
but unproductive and the poor but productive can be expected to bind (see Section 4).
To overcome this difficulty we have adopted two approaches. First, we have consid-
ered general analytical restrictions pertaining to the correlation between characteristics.
When combined with additional assumptions on demands (or endowment distribution),
these restrictions have been shown to lead to rather simple and intuitive taxation rules
(such as the positive relationship between tax rates and income elasticities). Second, we
have presented some illustrative examples for which the solution (including the pattern
of binding incentive constraints) has been determined numerically.
To achieve a more precise characterization of the optimal commodity tax structure
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and, most importantly, to make effective policy recommendations, both approaches
would have to be pursued further. In particular, the analytical part could be refined
by using empirical evidence on the joint distribution of unobservable characteristics
(and or the preference structure). More ambitiously, it might be insightful to base
the numerical calculations on a more “realistic” specification, calibrated on observed
pattern of demand and wealth/productivity distribution.
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